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I. INTRODUCTION
1

After nearly two decades and several trips to the U.S. Court of
2
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit Court”), the
Federal Communications Commission’s wish to rid itself of the burden of
3
processing and warehousing reams of long-distance domestic tariffs
4
became a reality on July 31, 2001.
5
In a May 9, 2000 Public Notice following the D.C. Circuit Court’s
6
decision upholding the FCC’s mandatory detariffing order, long-distance
1

See MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Starting in the
early 1980s, the Commission tried to prohibit tariff-filing by nondominant carriers—in
essence, those other than AT&T—but that effort was successfully challenged in this court in
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC . . . where we struck down ‘mandatory detariffing’
as inconsistent with the 1934 Act.”); see also Susan Bahr, Detariffing Long Distance:
Detariffing Spells Liability for Carriers, But There’s Room for Maneuvering, AM.
available
at
May
1,
1999,
at
23,
NETWORK,
http://www.americasnetwork.com/issues/99issues/990501/990501wash.htm (“The FCC has
been trying to detariff long distance service for more than 16 years.”).
2. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that
the Commission’s mandatory detariffing order was against the Communications Act of
1934); see also MCI WorldCom, 209 F.3d 760 (holding that the Petitioner’s challenges to
the Commission’s detariffing order were unfounded, and that the Commission could
establish detariffing under the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
3. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 872 (16th ed. 2000)
(Tariffs are “[d]ocuments filed by a regulated telephone company with a state public utility
commission or the Federal Communications Commission. The tariff, a public document,
details services, equipment and pricing offered by the telephone company (a common
carrier) to all potential customers.”).
4. See generally MCI WorldCom v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (holding that the Petitioner’s
challenges to the Commission’s detariffing order were unfounded and, therefore, the
Commission could establish detariffing under the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
5. See Domestic, Interexchange Carrier Detariffing Order Takes Effect; Common
Carrier Bureau Implements Nine-Month Transition Period; Comment Sought on
Modifications to Transition Plan, Public Notice, 16 F.C.C.R. 3688 (2000) [hereinafter
Detariffing Public Notice].
6. See MCI WorldCom, 209 F.3d 760.

MARASHLIAN-MAC11.DOC

Number 2]

DEATH OF THE FILED TARIFF DOCTRINE

02/26/02 1:23 PM

283

carriers were required to withdraw their paper tariffs for domestic long7
distance mass market services from the Commission. In the place of filed
tariffs, long-distance carriers were required to post their “rates, terms and
condition[s]” on their Internet Web sites or, if they did not maintain a Web
site, to make this information available in one central location where the
8
public could inspect them during regular business hours. Similar
requirements applied to carriers offering specialized customer
9
arrangements, or “contract tariffs.” The deadline for posting contract
10
tariffs on the Internet was also January 31, 2001.
In what can be described as a paroxysm of overzealous consumerism,
the FCC, in effect, announced its opinion that as a result of detariffing,
carriers may no longer rely upon the Filed Tariff Doctrine (a.k.a. Filed Rate
11
Doctrine). The chief effect of this announcement, expressly encouraged
7. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, 11 F.C.C.R. 7141, para. 30, 3 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 2259
(1996) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rule Making] (“Finally, we tentatively conclude that
forbearing from imposing tariff filing requirements on non-dominant interexchange carriers
is consistent with the public interest.”); see also MCI WorldCom, 209 F.3d at 766 (“Indeed,
the 1996 Act provides that [i]f the Commission determines that . . . forbearance will
promote competition . . . that determination may be the basis for a . . . finding that
forbearance is in the public interest. It was certainly reasonable to move regulation in that
direction even if it ostensibly raises transaction costs for the carriers.) (internal citations
omitted). The ultimate date to effect contract tariff detariffing was January 31, 2001.
8. Detariffing Public Notice, supra note 5, at 36913.
Section 42.10 (a) of the Commission’s rules requires that: ‘[a] nondominant
interexchange carrier shall make available to any member of the public, in at least
one location, during regular business hours, information concerning its current
rates, terms and condition for all of its detariffed interstate, domestic,
interexchange services. Such information shall be made available in an easy to
understand format and in a timely manner.’ . . . Section 42.10 (b) of the
Commission’s rules states that: ‘a nondominant IXC that maintains an Internet
website shall make such rate and service information specified in paragraph (a) of
this section available on-line at its Internet website in a timely and easily
accessible manner, and shall update this information regularly (sic to omit end
single quotation mark).) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
9. See Common Carrier Bureau Extends Transition Period for Detariffing Consumer
Long Distance Services, Public Notice, 16 F.C.C.R. 3747 (2000) [hereinafter Public Notice]
(“IXCs must still complete the process of detariffing domestic contract-type services by
January 31, 2001.”).
10. Id.
11. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915). The filed
rate doctrine is a judicially-created doctrine created under the Interstate Commerce Act. In
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court described the rules of the
doctrine:
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly filed is the only
lawful charge. Deviation from it is not permitted upon any pretext . . . . This rule
is undeniably strict and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it
embodies the policy which has been adopted by Congress in the regulation of
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by the FCC, is to open the carrier-customer relationship to the scrutiny of
state authorities, like the State Attorneys General and state consumerprotection laws. In addition, legal challenges based upon the principles of
12
contract law were also “endorsed” by the FCC.
The consequences of such an environment are directly linked to the
financial bottom line of long-distance carriers. Today it can cost a long13
distance carrier approximately $300 to acquire a new customer or to retain
an existing customer. Without tariffs, it is certain that these costs will rise
and even explode to $1,000 or more. A carrier’s costs of complying with
14
15
the strict liability standard of the anti-slamming, anti-cramming, and
16
other consumer-protection rules have been extremely high. Now that the
Attorneys General of the states and other state consumer agencies are able
to attack the sales and marketing practices of long-distance carriers under
state consumer-protection laws, compliance and appeasement costs are
interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination.
Id.
12. See Thomas K. Crowe, Detariffing: The Transition Begins, BUS. COMM. REV., Aug.
2000, at 30, available at http://www.bcr.com/voicecon/articles/b0006p28.asp [hereinafter
Crowe]. The article states:
The FCC’s detariffing rulings also may complicate the issue of who governs the
legal relationship between carriers and their customers. Under a tariffed regulatory
regime, disputes between end users and carriers were often subject to federal
communications law. In the absence of tariffs, the FCC has indicated that state
consumer protection and contract laws will apply, as well as the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, with respect to the lawfulness of rates, terms and
conditions. In short, both federal and state law will apply to the carrier/customer
relationship. Such shared jurisdiction will almost certainly complicate disputes
and contested cases between end users and carriers.
13. See Peter McCullagh et al., Drumming for the Mass Market’s Attention May Yet
Pay Off, ELECTRIC, LIGHT & POWER, Feb. 1999, at 20. The article states:
In the telecommunications industry, the cost to acquire a residential long distance
customer is between $200 and $300 . . . . This cost, which includes sales, order
processing and the service expenses associated with bringing on a new customer,
requires that the customer stay with the long distance carrier for at least 12 months
for the company to simply break even.
Id.
14. See Implementation of the Subscriber Carrier Selection Changes Provisions of the
Telecomm. Act of 1996; Policies and Rules Concerning Unauthorized Changes of
Consumers Long Distance Carriers, First Order on Reconsideration, 15 F.C.C.R. 8158,
para. 1, 20 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 395 (2000). Slamming is the “unauthorized change of a
subscriber’s preferred carrier.” Id.
15. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 178 (17th ed. 2001).
Cramming is the “practice in which customers are billed for unexpected telephone charges,
which they typically didn’t order, authorize or use.” Id.
16. See, e.g., State of Maryland, Office of the Attorney General, Consumer Education
Publications, at http://www.oag.state.md.us/consumer/edunit.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2001) (providing a list which gives links to state consumer protection laws and
publications).
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17

likely to skyrocket. This is even more troubling in the current regulatory
environment in which State Attorneys General offices, utility commissions,
and the FCC use a handful of customer complaints to extract costly
settlements from carriers. The bottom line is that the incentives created by
the enforcement of the slamming rules (to make headlines and political hay
and gain revenues for state and federal coffers through this
telecommunications version of the “speed trap”) have never been greater
and will only increase as a result of detariffing.
The bad news does not end there for long-distance carriers. Single
plaintiff and class action civil suits for misrepresentation, fraud, breach of
contract, and even unfair competition are all now certain to become a larger
part of the regulatory fabric of telecommunications. While this view of the
FCC’s detariffing action can and will be disputed, and the argument will be
made that consumers must be protected, it cannot be denied that the FCC
and its state brethren have not paid the slightest attention to the other side
of the story. That is, the costs that will be imposed on all consumers
because of the desire to penalize carriers, without limits, for the allegations
of a few consumers. This will be the real legacy of FCC-mandated
detariffing.
Since detariffing has only been in effect for a short while, it is too
early to gauge even the near term economic and operational impacts of the
detariffing mandates and Internet posting requirements. But the FCC and
state regulatory agencies have already acted to use consumer protection
laws to affect the legal relationship of carriers with their existing and future
customers, and to change the fundamental jurisdictional environment in
which carriers must market, price, and operate. This Article will explore
some of these issues.
This Article reviews the history of the FCC’s detariffing efforts. It
then addresses the major issue raised not so much by detariffing itself, but
by the FCC’s view of the detariffing order’s impact on the Filed Tariff
Doctrine. This legal doctrine is one under which long-distance carriers have
operated for decades. Its principal effect is to override general contract and
state consumer protection laws that are designed to protect individuals in
order to advance and protect broader public interests. Notwithstanding the
existence of the Doctrine for nearly a century or the Supreme Court’s
recent unequivocal affirmation of its continued validity and vitality, the

17. See Judianne Triglia, Qwest Gets Out of Slam-Jam, AM. NETWORK WEEKLY, May 4,
2001, at http://www.americasnetwork.com/enews/2001/May/20010504.htm. “Creany
[Pennsylvania’s Senior Deputy Attorney General] says the reason for a reduction in
slamming is most likely due to more strict regulations as opposed to the general goodwill
and concern of carriers.” Id.
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FCC, through detariffing, has declared the Doctrine dead. The Authors
18
have formally opposed the FCC’s declaration and restate and update that
opposition herein. In Part III, this Article shows that the Doctrine is alive
and well, and in a government of laws, not men, the doctrine will stay that
way until the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress explicitly says otherwise.
This Article moreover suggests that the FCC’s motivations behind
detariffing have failed to consider, much less attempted to properly
balance, the conflicting public interests involved. Instead, the FCC has
substituted political expediency and populous pandering for its
19
congressionally-imposed duty to regulate in the public interest.
This Article also compares and contrasts the legal rights enjoyed by
long-distance carriers under the Filed Tariff Doctrine to the rights and
potential liabilities of carriers in its absence. Finally, this Article discusses
the actions several states have taken immediately following the July 31,
2001 effective date of the FCC’s mass-market detariffing order and
simultaneous declaration that the Filed Tariff Doctrine is dead. The Article
concludes that the FCC’s action is a manifest injustice to both carriers and
consumers alike, and is a prime example of irresponsible agency
regulation.

II. MARCH TOWARDS DETARIFFING
The FCC’s determination to eliminate tariffs immediately followed
the breakup of the Bell System (also referred to in this Article as “the
20
AT&T monopoly”). The Commission’s motivation, although cloaked in
consumer protection rhetoric, has always been derived from the more
selfish desire to rid itself of the administrative burdens associated with
21
tariffing.
18. See generally 2000 Biennial Reg. Review, Policy and Rules Concerning the Int’l,
Interexchange Marketplace, Comments of Global Telecompetition Consultants, Inc. [today
“GTC Consultants”] in Response to Notice for Proposed Rulemaking, IB Docket No. 00202, 2000 WL 1532401 (F.C.C. Oct. 18, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Biennial Reg. Review].
19. See generally Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), as amended by the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (The
FCC’s duty to regulate in the public interest is strewn throughout the Act).
20. See generally Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier
Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefore, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule
Making, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry]. See also MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (The FCC’s Sixth Report and Order, which
called for mandatory detariffing, was challenged in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals by
MCI Telecommunications Corp. The Court of Appeals determined that the FCC did not
have the statutory authority to mandate detariffing.).
21. See Bahr, supra note 1, at 23 (“But as stated by [former] FCC Commissioner Susan
Ness, tariffs are deposited in an ‘obscure corner’ of the FCC and consumers do not have
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Section 203 of the Communications Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)
23
requires all common carriers to file tariffs showing “all charges” for the
“interstate and foreign wire or radio communications services” they
provide, as well as “the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting
24
such charges.” For over sixty years, when the AT&T monopoly alone
dominated the long-distance industry, the Commission felt little burden
administering its duties under Section 203. With the proliferation of
competitive carriers in the 1980s, however, the burden seemingly proved
too onerous for the FCC, and thus the Commission began its unrelenting
25
campaign in favor of detariffing.
The FCC’s campaign was immediately halted in its tracks when in
1985 the D.C. Circuit Court overturned the Commission’s initial attempt to
26
order mandatory detariffing.
Subsequently, the FCC adopted a
27
permissive—that is, optional—detariffing policy which met the same fate
28
in the D.C. Circuit Court. The court opined that the 1934 Act did not
legally authorize the FCC to implement a detariffing policy, permissive or
29
otherwise. Nearly a decade later, the tide turned in the FCC’s favor when
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act),
giving the FCC the authority to forbear from regulatory measures
30
determined to be unnecessary to protect consumers.
ready access to them.”).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
23. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1994) (“‘Common carrier’ or ‘carrier’ means any person
engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio . . . .”).
24. See 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
25. See generally Notice of Inquiry, supra note 20. The FCC’s Competitive Carrier
rule-making began in 1979 with this notice.
26. See MCI Telecomm. Corp., 765 F.2d 1186.
27. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 31,
56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1219 (1983) (“We conclude that these carriers are non-dominant
currently and are likely to be so in the future . . . . Non-dominant carriers not treated by
forbearance . . . will be subject to streamlined regulation.”).
28. See AT&T Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that forbearance or
permissive detariffing treatment, as extended to certain carriers by the Commission’s Fourth
Report, is plainly contrary to Section 203 of the Communications Act of 1934).
29. Id. at 736 (“We do not quarrel with the Commission’s policy objectives. But the
statute, as we have interpreted it, is not open to the Commission’s construction. The
Commission will have to obtain congressional sanction for its desired policy course.”).
30. See MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2000), which
states:
The landscape changed, however, when Congress passed the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, which requires the FCC to forbear from applying any regulation or
any provision of this chapter to a telecommunications carrier or
telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers or
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With its new forbearance authority, the FCC resurrected mandatory
31
detariffing through its 1996 Detariffing Order. Although carriers
succeeded in staying the Order pending judicial review for several more
years, on April 28, 2000 the D.C. Circuit Court denied the appeals, and on
32
May 1, 2000 lifted the stay. Days later, the FCC issued its Public Notice
33
establishing a Transition Plan and cementing its detariffing mandate.
The Transition Plan required all carriers to cancel and withdraw their
existing interexchange domestic tariffs, including contract tariffs, within
34
nine months, or by January 31, 2001. The FCC later extended the deadline
35
for mass-market tariffs until July 31, 2001.
Now that both of these critical dates have passed, domestic detariffing
36
is in full effect. One would think that an industry that had operated
pursuant to tariffs throughout its existence, and had battled the FCC’s
attempts to detariff for nearly twenty years, would be making a great deal
of noise about transitioning to the new environment. For the most part,
however, the industry has been very quiet. Why is this the case? This
silence quite possibly stems from uncertainty and fear. Fear that uncertainty
about the status of the key component of tariffing, the Filed Tariff
37
Doctrine, and fear that their chosen method of addressing the FCC’s
38
mandates (i.e., Internet posting of rates, terms and conditions and
telecommunications services, in any or some of its or their geographic markets, if
the Commission determines that –
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the
charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and reasonable
and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory. . . .
Armed with this new statutory authority, the FCC moved once more to detariff the
interstate, domestic, interexchange services of nondominant carriers—now all of
the interexchange companies. (internal citations omitted).
31. Second Report and Order, infra note 40.
32. MCI WorldCom, 209 F.3d 760.
33. Detariffing Public Notice, supra note 5.
34. See Public Notice, supra note 9.
35. See Common Carrier Bureau Extends Transition Period for Detariffing Consumer
Long Distance Services, Public Notice, 16 F.C.C.R. 2906, para. 1 (2001).
36. See Detariffing of Long Distance Telephone Industry to Become Effective at the
FCC
News
Release,
at
End
of
the
Month,
July
25,
2001,
http://www.fcc.gov/bureaus/common_carrier/news_releases/2001/nrcc0130.html.
37. David Rohde, Court Upholds FCC Detariffing Order, NETWORKWORLDFUSION,
May 1, 2000, at http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2000/0501fcctariff.html, “[T]he [MCI
WorldCom] ruling likely signals the end of the road for the ‘filed rate doctrine,’ an obscure
legal concept that nevertheless has bedeviled users over the years. Under this long-standing
principle, any tariff filed with a government agency in a regulated industry has legal
precedence over a private contract.” Id.
38. See, e.g., Sprint’s Web page, at http://www.sprint.com/ratesandconditions (last
visited Sept. 26, 2001) (describing Sprint’s rates, terms and conditions); see also WorldCom

MARASHLIAN-MAC11.DOC

Number 2]

02/26/02 1:23 PM

289

DEATH OF THE FILED TARIFF DOCTRINE
39

establishing carrier-customer relationship in a detariffed environment) not
only complies with the FCC’s expectations, but also offers adequate legal
protections in the event that the Filed Tariff Doctrine ceases to exist, as the
FCC insists.
In its October 1996 Order directing the mandatory detariffing of
domestic interstate, interexchange services, the FCC repeatedly announced
its philosophy that the absence of tariffs will eliminate the possible
40
invocation of the filed rate (or tariff) doctrine. Most companies, carriers
and legal analysts have interpreted these proclamations as doing away with
the Doctrine. The FCC may have done away with tariffs, but has it only
succeeded in throwing out the baby with the bathwater by abolishing the
Filed Tariff Doctrine through detariffing?

III. DETARIFFING AND THE FILED TARIFF DOCTRINE: IS IT
DEAD OR ALIVE?
A.

The Filed Tariff Doctrine41

The Filed Tariff Doctrine originated from the interpretation of the
42
Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) of 1887. The first case discussing the
ICA’s prohibition against discrimination and requirement that published
rates be followed was New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v.
43
Interstate Commerce Commission. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the purpose of the ICA was:
[T]o secure equality of rates as to all and to destroy favoritism, these
last being accomplished by requiring the publication of tariffs and by

Web page, at http://www.worldcom.com/publications/service_guide/products/ (last visited
Sept. 26, 2001) (listing WorldCom’s products, services, terms and pricing).
39. See, e.g., WorldCom Web page, at http://www.worldcom.com/publications/
services_guide/product_packages_currently_available (last visited Sept. 26, 2001) (listing
various special customer arrangements offered by WorldCom).
40. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace,
Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Second
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 20,730, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1199 (1996) [hereinafter
Second Report and Order].
41. The terms “filed rate doctrine” and “Filed Tariff Doctrine” are synonymous in this
Article. The phrases are interchanged throughout in order to be consistent with the
documents from which they are quoted.
42. See Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327, repealed by Pub. L. No. 95473, §§ 4(b)-4(c), 92 Stat. 1466, 1470 (1978). The Interstate Commerce Act, among others,
required motor carriers to file their rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission in the
form of a tariff (49 U.S.C. § 10762(a)(1)); prohibits motor carriers from transporting goods
at rates other than their tariff rates (49 U.S.C. § 10761(a)); and requires them to treat like
customers alike (49 U.S.C. § 10741).
43. 200 U.S. 361 (1906).
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prohibiting secret departures from such tariffs, and forbidding rebates,
preferences and all other forms of undue discrimination. To this extent
and for these purposes, the statute was remedial and is, therefore,
entitled to receive that interpretation which reasonably accomplishes
44
the great public purpose which it was enacted to subserve.

The Supreme Court has recognized that the doctrine may create
hardship in certain cases, “but it embodies the policy which has been
adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce in order to
45
prevent unjust discrimination.”
46
Congress enacted the 1996 Act with language similar to the ICA.
Courts have applied the Filed Tariff Doctrine under the ICA to the
47
Communications Act using the same rationale. The Filed Tariff Doctrine
under the Communications Act requires a regulated carrier to charge the
tariff rate established with the regulatory agency, even if it has quoted a
lower rate to its customer. To do otherwise would give a preference to, and
48
discriminate in favor of, one customer over another. Even where the
carrier’s representation is fraudulent, the aggrieved customer cannot assert
that he should be charged the quoted rate because customers are presumed
49
to know the terms of the applicable tariff.
In 1998, two years following passage of the 1996 Act and the FCC’s
adoption of its October 1996 Order mandating detariffing, the Supreme
Court, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority, unequivocally
reaffirmed the principles and applicability of the Filed Tariff Doctrine to

44. Id. at 391. See also Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 80 (1908):
If the rates are subject to secret alteration by special agreement then the statute
will fail of its purpose to establish a rate duly published, known to all, and from
which neither shipper nor carrier may depart . . . . Any other construction of the
statute opens the door to the possibility of the very abuses of unequal rates which
it was the design of the statute to prohibit and punish.
45. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915).
46. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (1994).
47. See AT&T Co. v. New York City Human Res. Admin., 833 F. Supp. 962, 979
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(“The Communications Act, of course, was based upon the ICA and must be read in
conjunction with it.”); see also ABC v. FCC, 643 F.2d 818, 820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“To
understand the purposes of the Communications Act . . . we must look to the legislative
history of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, for the Communications Act borrowed its
language and purpose from the Interstate Commerce Act.”). Additionally, cases decided
under the ICA are controlling precedent for interpreting the effect of tariffs filed under the
Communications Act because common carrier communications companies were regulated
under the ICA prior to the enactment of the Communications Act. See MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. Best Tel. Co., 898 F. Supp. 868, 872 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1994); see also ABC, 643 F.2d
at 821 n.2; Elec. Indus. Assoc. v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1109, 1115 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
48. Marco Supply Co. v. AT&T Comm., Inc., 875 F.2d 434, 436 (4th Cir. 1989).
49. Id.
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50

telecommunications carrier services. Justice Scalia stated that strict
application of the doctrine was necessary to avoid discriminatory pricing
and noted that this policy is at the heart of Title II, the Common Carrier
51
Section of the 1996 Act.
Clearly, the Filed Tariff Doctrine is a long-standing, judicially-created
doctrine that the courts continue to apply, even in the aftermath of the
52
October 1996 Detariffing Order. In its numerous Notices of Proposed
53
54
Rule Making (“NPRM”) and Orders on the issue of detariffing, the FCC
has time and again recognized that the filed rate doctrine is a long held
legal doctrine created by judicial decisions applying the express words of a
55
federal statute. Given that the doctrine is a judicially-created mandate, the
56
principle of stare decisis prevents the FCC from interpreting the same
50. AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222 (1998) (“Accordingly, the
century-old ‘filed rate doctrine’ associated with the ICA tariff provisions applies to the
Communications Act as well.”).
51. Id.
52. See Allworld Commun. Network, L.L.C. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., No. 99 Civ.
4256, 2000 WL 1013956, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2000) (filed rate doctrine bars state law
claims which seek to alter the terms and conditions provided for in the tariff but the filed
rate doctrine does not bar this claim of interference with contractual relations). See also
Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) (filed rate doctrine bars
challenge of carrier’s pass-through fee of Universal Service Fund); Sandwich Chef of
Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 867, 874 (S.D. Tex. 2000)
(filed rate doctrine is inapplicable where the defendants charged plaintiffs above tariffed
rates); Guglielmo v. WorldCom, Inc., No. Civ.C-00-160-B, 2000 WL 1507426, at *6
(D.N.H. July 27, 2000) (artful pleading doctrine cannot be used to circumvent general rule
that a preemption defense like the filed rate doctrine does not justify removal, therefore
remanding the case to state court).
53. See discussion supra Part II.
54. See discussion supra Part II.
55. See Second Report and Order, supra note 40, paras. 55, 60. The FCC notes that
“courts have long held that, in a situation where a filed tariff rate, or other term or condition,
differs from a rate, term, or condition set in a non-tariffed carrier-customer contract, the
carrier is required to impose the tariffed rate, term or condition.” Id. para. 55. In discussing
permissive detariffing, the Commission again recognized that “the filed rate doctrine is a
legal doctrine developed by judicial precedent . . . .” Id. para. 60. See also Policy and Rules
Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace; Implementation of Section 254(g) of
the Comms. Act of 1934, as Amended, Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 15014, para.
3, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 145 (1997) [hereinafter Order on Reconsideration] (noting that
the concepts behind the filed rate doctrine are “pursuant to the ‘filed rate’ doctrine
articulated by the courts.”); Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange
Marketplace; Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Comms. Act of 1934, as Amended,
Second Order on Reconsideration and Erratum, 14 F.C.C.R. 6004, para. 1, 15 Comm. Reg.
(P & F) 316 (1999) [hereinafter Second Order on Reconsideration and Erratum] (“[U]nder
the judicially created ‘filed-rate’ doctrine, the tariffed rate for a service is the only lawful
rate that the carrier may charge for that service.”).
56. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “stare decisis” as
“[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial
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language in a contradictory manner. Once a court has determined “a
statute’s clear meaning,” courts must adhere to that determination and
judge “an agency’s interpretation of the statute” against the court’s “prior
57
determination of the statute’s meaning.” The Filed Tariff Doctrine is a
result of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ICA and the
58
Telecommunications Act of 1996. As such, the Commission lacks the
authority and jurisdiction to interpret the 1996 Act in any way that conflicts
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation.
Aside from the Supreme Court itself, the only authority that can alter
59
Supreme Court precedent is Congress. In concluding that the doctrine is
dead, the FCC rationalized that in today’s competitive environment, the
60
doctrine does not protect consumers and goes against the public interest.
This bootstrap rationalization does not and cannot support the FCC’s intent
and desire to abolish the Filed Tariff Doctrine. A regulatory agency’s mere
belief that circumstances have changed to such a degree as to undermine
established policies, laws, or regulations—no matter how seemingly welldocumented—does not vest in the agency the power to change the laws or
regulations put into effect by Congress, and interpreted and applied by the
61
Supreme Court. Only Congress, by legislative enactment, may modify or
62
overturn Supreme Court precedent. Until Congress does so, the courts are
bound to enforce precedent and the FCC’s conclusion that the doctrine is
dead is legally meaningless and without effect.
The Supreme Court has recognized these basic principles as far back
63
as 1908. In Armour Packing Co. v. United States, the Court stated that the
filed rate doctrine:
it is insisted, puts the shipper in many kinds of trade at the mercy of
the carrier, who may arbitrarily change a rate, upon the faith of which
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”).
57. See Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990).
58. See discussion supra Part II.
59. See Maislin Indus., U.S. v. A.J. Hollander Co., 176 B.R. 436, 445 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1995) (“Through its legislative power, Congress can overturn or modify any United
States Supreme Court decision, other than one turning on an interpretation of a
constitutional provision.”).
60. See Second Report and Order, supra note 40, para. 38 (“Moreover, we note that in
the absence of tariffs, consumers will be able to pursue remedies under state consumer
protection and contract laws in a manner currently precluded by the ‘filed-rate’ doctrine.”).
61. See Town of Deerfield v. FCC, 992 F.2d 420, 428 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Since neither the
legislative branch nor the executive branch has the power to review judgments of an Article
III court, an administrative agency such as the FCC, which is a creature of the legislative
and executive branches, similarly has no such power.”).
62. See A.J. Hollander Co., 176 B.R. at 444.
63. See generally Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 81-82 (1908)
(detailing the benefits of the filed rate doctrine).
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contracts have been entered into [and, thus, should not be applied]. But
the right to make such regulations is inherent in the power of Congress
to legislate respecting interstate commerce, and such considerations of
inconvenience or hardship address themselves to the lawmaking
64
branch of the Government.

The Supreme Court continues to apply the above principle, with vigor
and persistence, to agency attempts to contravene the filed rate doctrine.
65
For example, in Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., a case
brought under the ICA, the Court determined that an Interstate Commerce
Commission (“ICC”) policy effectively negating the Filed Tariff Doctrine
was invalid as being inconsistent with the Act and further noted that such
66
action is strictly within Congress’s legislative powers. Under the ICA,
motor common carriers must publish and file rates with the ICC and are
67
prohibited from providing services at any rate other than the filed rate.
The Supreme Court “has frequently stated, the statute does not permit
either a shipper’s ignorance or the carrier’s misquotation of the applicable
68
rate to serve as a defense to the collection of the filed rate.” This
statement notwithstanding, in 1986 the ICC determined that due to changes
in the motor carrier industry, greater flexibility of this harsh rule was
warranted; accordingly, the ICC implemented a policy of allowing carriers
69
and shippers to negotiate rates. The ICC reasoned, “the passage of the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which significantly deregulated the motor
carrier industry, justified the change in policy, for the new competitive
atmosphere made strict application of § 10761 [the File Tariff Doctrine]
70
unnecessary to deter discrimination.” Moreover, it reasoned that the
passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 and the Commission’s exemption
of all motor contract carriers from the filing requirements justified its
71
policy. Finally, the ICC argued that, in the more competitive environment,
strict adherence to the filed rate doctrine was not necessary to avoid

64. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
65. 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
66. See id. at 119, 131.
67. See id. at 120. (“The Act requires a motor common carrier to ‘publish and file with
the Commission tariffs containing the rates for transportation it may provide.’ . . . The Act
also specifically prohibits a carrier from providing services at any rate other than the filed
(also known as the tariff) rate . . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 121 (“In 1986, however, the ICC concluded that changes in the motor carrier
industry ‘clearly warrant a tempering of the former harsh rule of adhering to the tariff rate in
virtually all cases.’”) (quoting NITL—Petition to Institute RM on Negotiated Motor
Common Carrier Rates, 3 I.C.C. 2d 99, 106 (1986)).
70. Id. (citation omitted).
71. See Maislin Industries, 497 U.S. 116, 121.
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72

discrimination in this day and age.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and deemed the ICC’s
73
policy inconsistent with the ICA and subsequently invalid. The Court
rationalized that the doctrine, which has long governed the legal
relationship between shippers and carriers, is essential to preventing price
74
discrimination. Given the close interplay between the duty to file a tariff
and not stray from its rates, and also given the prohibition on
discrimination in the statute, the Court held that it must “read the statute to
create strict filed rate requirements and to forbid equitable defenses to
75
collection of the filed tariff.” As part of the rationale for its holding, the
majority noted:
Congress has not diverged from this interpretation and we decline to
revisit it ourselves . . . . Once we have determined a statute’s clear
meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare
decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute
76
against our prior determination of the statute’s meaning.

Finally, the Court rejected the ICC’s arguments that the Motor Carrier Act
of 1980 (MCA), the exemptions from tariffing, and the more competitive
environment justified its policy. The Court stated that, “[a]lthough the
Commission has both the authority and expertise generally to adopt new
policies when faced with new developments in the industry, . . . it does not
have the power to adopt a policy that directly conflicts with its governing
77
statute.” Accordingly, the Court concluded: “If strict adherence to [the
ICA requirements] as embodied in the filed rate doctrine has become an
anachronism in the wake of the MCA, it is the responsibility of Congress to
78
modify or eliminate these sections.”
Ultimately, Congress did address this issue with the Negotiated Rates
79
Act of 1993, which effectively overturned the Maislin decision
invalidating the ICC’s Negotiated Rates Policy. It was held that Congress’s
actions in overturning this decision through legislative enactment were not
72. See id.
73. See id. at 130.
For a century, this Court has held that the Act, as it incorporates the filed rate
doctrine, forbids as discriminatory the secret negotiation and collection of rates
lower than the filed rate. . . . By refusing to order collection of the filed rate solely
because the parties had agreed to a lower rate, the ICC has permitted the very
price discrimination that the Act by its terms seeks to prevent.
Id. (citations omitted).
74. See id. at 126.
75. Id. at 127.
76. Id. at 131 (internal citation omitted).
77. Id. at 134-35 (internal citation omitted).
78. Id. at 135-36 (emphasis added).
79. Pub. L. No. 103-180, 107 Stat. 2044 (1993).
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violations of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, because “[t]hrough its
legislative power, Congress can overturn or modify any United States
Supreme Court decision, other than one turning on an interpretation of a
80
constitutional provision.” The same should hold true for the 1996 Act
requirements embodied in the filed rate doctrine.
The final defense against the FCC’s action is the Separation of
Powers principle. Under this principle, judgments of Article III courts, and
most importantly the Supreme Court, are not subject to review by the other
branches of government. As a constitutional principle, Article III courts
81
may not render advisory opinions. Accordingly,
A judgment entered by an Article III court having jurisdiction to enter
that judgment is not subject to review by a different branch of the
government, for if a decision of the judicial branch were subject to
direct revision by the executive or legislative branch, the court’s
82
decision would in effect be merely advisory.

Additionally, “[s]ince neither the legislative branch nor the executive
branch has the power to review judgments of an Article III court, an
administrative agency such as the FCC, which is a creature of the
83
legislative and executive branches, similarly has no such power.” This,
without a doubt, precludes the FCC from reviewing, let alone abolishing,
Supreme Court doctrine. The FCC’s attempt to overturn the long-held,
Supreme Court-created Filed Tariff Doctrine can only be described as ultra
vires and contrary to the rule of law.

B.

The FCC’s Decision Was Arbitrary and Capricious

Typically, FCC decisions like its detariffing Order are entitled to
84
Chevron deference, meaning that agency interpretations of their own
85
regulations are entitled to substantial deference. While this may be true,
such agency interpretation may be set aside where a court finds that “it is
the product of a decisionmaking process deemed arbitrary or capricious, or
86
if it lacks factual support.” This authority is vested in the courts under the
80. See A.J. Hollander Co., 176 B.R. at 445.
81. See Town of Deerfield, 992 F.2d at 427.
82. Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 428.
84. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
85. See id. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations ‘has been
consistently followed by this Court . . . .’”) (citations omitted).
86. See Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575-76 (10th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted); see generally Necketopoulos v. Shalala, 941 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to the issuance of a regulation by the
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87

Administrative Procedure Act. In reviewing an agency action under this
standard, a court must determine “whether the agency examined the
relevant data and articulated a rational connection between the facts found
88
and the decision made.” Moreover, a court must find that the agency
made clear its course of inquiry, analysis, and rationale for its ultimate
89
decision.
The FCC’s conclusion that detariffing eliminates the possible
invocation of the Filed Tariff Doctrine does not meet the above standards
and should have been found arbitrary and capricious by the D.C. Circuit
90
Court of Appeals. First, in its March 25, 1996 NPRM, the FCC made the
conclusory statement, with nothing more, that “the absence of tariffs would
91
eliminate possible invocation by carriers of the filed rate doctrine.”
92
Moreover, it did not directly seek any comments on this conclusion.
93
Second, in its October 31, 1996 Second Report & Order, which
mandated full detariffing, the FCC concluded that the Filed Tariff Doctrine
is not in the public interest and does not protect consumers, but neglected
94
to provide any analysis for this conclusion. Specifically, the Commission
found that “[c]omplete detariffing would also further the public interest by
95
eliminating the ability of carriers to invoke the ‘filed-rate’ doctrine.”
While, in the next breath, the Commission recognized this doctrine as a
long-held legal precedent, it made no attempt to analyze how detariffing
would eliminate the filed-rate doctrine or to justify its apparent position
96
that it has authority to overturn long-held judicial precedent.
Third, in rejecting the concept of permissive tariffing in the August
97
20, 1997 Order on Reconsideration, the Commission discussed the
harmful effects of the Filed Tariff Doctrine to carrier-customer
relationships and to customers who sign up for long-term service

Secretary of Health and Human Services).
87. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2000). Specifically, Section 570 of the Administrative
Procedure Act provides for the possibility of judicial review if otherwise provided by law.
88. See Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1574 (internal footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 1575.
90. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 7.
91. Id. para. 34.
92. See id.
93. See Second Report and Order, supra note 40.
94. Id. para. 55.
95. Id.
96. Id. para. 60 (“Because the filed rate doctrine is a legal doctrine developed by
judicial precedent, it is not entirely clear how courts would apply the filed rate
doctrine . . . .”).
97. See Order on Reconsideration, supra note 55.
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98

contracts. In addition, it rejected arguments that the doctrine benefits
99
customers “by creating certainty in the carrier-customer relationship.” The
Commission, however, never set out its analysis and rationale for
concluding that detariffing would eliminate the invocation of the Filed
100
Tariff Doctrine. In its October 18, 2000 Notice of Proposed Rule
101
Making the Commission again set forth the same conclusions without the
102
requisite analysis.
Finally, in its March 31, 1999 Second Order on Reconsideration and
103
Erratum the Commission made the sweeping conclusion that the filed
rate doctrine should not apply to the public disclosure requirement because
the public disclosure requirement is not a “filing requirement” under the
104
1996 Act. Again, the Commission failed to provide any analysis or
105
rationale for this determination. Rather, the Commission’s conclusion
elevates form over substance, completely disregarding the fact that the
“posting” or “public disclosure” requirement achieves the same goal as the
Filed Tariff Doctrine does: protection of both consumer and carrier
interests. It should be noted that the Commission’s view is not always the
last word on the subject. Agency statutory interpretation is subject to
judicial review and, while such interpretation is afforded a certain degree of
106
deference, courts have the final word on statutory interpretation.
In short, the Commission’s statements are replete with conclusions
that detariffing will kill the filed rate doctrine and contain only minor
107
discussions of the rationale for killing the doctrine. Nonetheless, the FCC
completely failed to set out any analysis and rationale why the mere refusal

98. Id. paras. 12, 13.
99. Id. para. 13.
100. See id. para. 12 (The Commission merely stated, “We are not persuaded that a
permissive detariffing regime would eliminate possible invocation of the ‘filed-rate’
doctrine.”).
101. 2000 Biennial Reg. Review, supra note 18.
102. Id. para 15 (“In accordance with our conclusions in the Detariffing Order on
Reconsideration, we tentatively conclude that tariffs for international interexchange services
may have negative consequences for consumers because of the application of the ‘filed-rate’
doctrine.”) (internal citations omitted).
103. Second Order on Reconsideration and Erratum, supra note 55.
104. Id. para. 17.
105. See id.
106. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
(“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”); see also
Sicard v. Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1435 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (“[T]he final power of
interpretation is in the courts.”).
107. See 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 18.
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to continue to accept paper/electronic filings at the FCC —the only
legitimate aspects of detariffing the FCC may have the power to pursue—
overturns and nullifies the doctrine. More importantly, the Commission
totally fails to provide any analysis or justification supporting its authority
109
to make such a determination. All of the rationale in the Commission’s
Orders supports the conclusion that tariff requirements are no longer
110
necessary. Ancillary to this conclusion, the Commission concludes that
the absence of tariffs will eliminate the Filed Tariff Doctrine. Just as it
justified its primary conclusion, the Commission must justify this
secondary conclusion. Its failure to do so clearly evidences a decisionmaking process that is arbitrary and capricious, lacking any rational
111
connection between the facts found and the decision made.
Tangentially, but equally relevant, the FCC’s decision is arbitrary and
capricious because it circumvents the balancing of interests Congress
112
sought to achieve in enacting the language of Section 203(c). Courts have
repeatedly held that the specific scheme intended by Congress’s enactment
113
of Sections 203 through 205 of the Communications Act was based on a
careful balance of competing interests, and the Commission may not ignore
that balance or rewrite this statutory scheme based on its own interpretation
114
of the interests involved. While these cases admittedly predate the 1996
Act, the rationale remains unscathed. In asserting that its detariffing policy
abolishes the Filed Tariff Doctrine, the FCC effectively discounts the
delicate balance of interests Congress recognized in enacting Section
115
203(c). The Commission may not “rewrite this statutory scheme on the
116
basis of its own conception of the equities of a particular situation.” It
bears repeating that if the Commission believes that the mandates of the
1996 Act are “inadequate to the task of regulating the telecommunications
industry in light of changed circumstances, the Commission must take its
108. See id.
109. See discussion supra Part II.
110. See 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 18, para. 15 (“Because of
carriers’ rights to invoke the ‘filed-rate’ doctrine and bind customers to tariffed offerings,
tariffs, even if filed on a permissive basis, preclude consumers from pursuing remedies
under state consumer protection and contract laws that are generally available to consumers
in any other unregulated, competitive environment.”).
111. Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575 (10th Cir. 1994).
112. 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1994).
113. 47 U.S.C. §§ 203-205 (1994).
114. See Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1995); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985); AT&T Co. v. FCC, 487 F.2d
865 (2d Cir. 1973).
115. See 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1994).
116. See Southwestern Bell Corp., 43 F.3d at 1520.

MARASHLIAN-MAC11.DOC

Number 2]

02/26/02 1:23 PM

DEATH OF THE FILED TARIFF DOCTRINE

299

117

case to Congress.” Any other FCC action under such circumstances is
clearly arbitrary and capricious and thus subject to doubt.

C. The FCC Violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act by Not
Outlining How the Elimination of the Doctrine Would Affect Small
Businesses
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, final agency rules must contain
certain information:
Each final regulatory flexibility analysis shall contain . . . a description
of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic
impact on small entities consistent with the stated objectives of
applicable statutes, including a statement of the factual, policy, and
legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rule and
why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule considered
118
by the agency which affect the impact on small entities was rejected.

The FCC shirked its responsibility in clear violation of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. In making its analysis in the October 1996 Detariffing
119
Order, the FCC only notes that its decision to detariff will benefit all
120
consumers, some of whom are small business entities. It also summarily
rejects arguments that full detariffing will harm small nondominant
121
interexchange carriers. The analysis mentions the Filed Tariff Doctrine
only in the context of rejecting permissive tariffing, where the Commission
states:
We believe that detariffing on a permissive basis would not
definitively eliminate the possible invocation of the ‘filed-rate’
doctrine and would create the risk of price signalling. We believe that
only with complete detariffing can we definitively eliminate these
possible anticompetitive practices and protect consumers, some of
122
which are small business entities.

In addition, the Commission asserts that the “public interest benefit of
removing carriers’ ability to invoke the ‘filed-rate’ doctrine applies equally
123
with respect to terms and conditions as to rates.”
Such perfunctory analysis of the doctrine does not meet the
124
requirements set out in the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The FCC’s
analysis fails to address (1) how the Commission reached such a
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1519.
5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(5) (2000).
See Second Report and Order, supra note 40.
Second Report and Order, supra note 40, para. 57.
Id.
Id. para. 154.
Id. para. 155.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000).
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conclusion; (2) how mandatory detariffing would definitively eliminate the
possible invocation of the doctrine; (3) how the elimination of the doctrine
would affect small carriers; or (4) the steps it has taken to minimize these
effects. Thus, even assuming that the Commission has the power to
reconsider and overturn established Supreme Court doctrine, it neglected to
follow the necessary procedural steps in doing so.

D. Conclusion: The FCC’s Mandatory Detariffing is an Ultra Vires
Attempt to Overturn the Filed Tariff Doctrine
In effecting mandatory detariffing, the FCC has attempted to overturn
the Filed Tariff Doctrine through assumptions of fact and authority that do
not exist. While the Commission may have authority to order mandatory
detariffing, it does not have the authority to abolish judicial precedent, or
Congressional mandates as interpreted and applied by such precedent, both
of which have unequivocally reaffirmed the Filed Tariff Doctrine. In
addition to ignoring its lack of authority to act, the FCC also failed to
follow the proper procedure under the Administrative Procedure Act and
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, thus further undercutting its ultra vires
attempts to do away with the doctrine.

IV. OPERATING IN A DETARIFFED ENVIRONMENT:
IMPLICATIONS OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
CONTRACT LAW IN ABSENCE OF FILED TARIFF DOCTRINE
Casting aside the ultra vires nature of the Commission’s action, the
practical consequences can be summarized in one word: liability. With the
stroke of a pen, the FCC has managed to expose carriers to a myriad of
liabilities from which they were previously protected under the Filed Tariff
125
Doctrine.
Given the decreased exposure to carriers under the “Filed Tariff
Doctrine” versus the “contract” environment, the dilemma for longdistance carriers is whether to proceed in the post-detariffing environment
on the assumption that the Filed Tariff Doctrine is still applicable, or
whether to alter their behavior to conform to an environment where the
absolute protections of the Filed Tariff Doctrine are not available. This
Section analyzes the exposure and protections available to carriers in both
the Filed Tariff Doctrine and non-Filed Tariff Doctrine (i.e., contracts)
environment, the ramifications of operating in a post-detariffing contract
world, and the steps that companies must take to protect themselves in such
a scenario.
125. See discussion supra Part II.
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The key distinctions between a Filed Tariff Doctrine environment and
a standard contract environment may be narrowed down to four
fundamental concerns: (1) the cost of doing business; (2) the exposure to
legal liability; (3) the ability to comply with regulatory requirements; and
(4) the exposure of regulatory interference, control of business
methodology, and management discretion.
First, looking at the changes that will affect the cost of doing
business, the elimination of the Filed Tariff Doctrine will affect the degree
of certainty that can be achieved in establishing and ordering business
relationships with tens of thousands of customers spread throughout the
country, as well as the efficiency and cost of doing so. The changes would
affect not only the companies’ external costs of customer acquisition,
retention, and care; but also the costs of internal management of personnel,
record retention, and upkeep, as well as potential increases in late and
unpaid charges, uncollectibles, and bad debts.
Second, carriers’ exposure to liability for monetary damages, fines,
and penalties will increase on all fronts. Customer claims for overcharges,
refunds, credits, and damages are all certain to rise. In addition, regulatory
claims for unreasonable practices, fraud and misrepresentation, State
Attorney General claims for consumer fraud and deceptive practices, class
actions on behalf of consumers, and finally, competitor claims for unfair
126
competition will become increasingly likely in a world without the Filed
Tariff Doctrine.
Third, carriers’ ability to comply with regulatory policies and
consumer-oriented regulations will be severely circumscribed as the claims
for legal liability outlined above begin to grow. Both the number and nature
of the claims will create a hostile environment for the carriers, which will
breed overzealous enforcement actions and more exacting analysis of the
carriers’ continued qualifications to operate as carriers in the multiple
jurisdictions in which they are located and must operate. In today’s
environment, in which state and federal agencies share and coordinate
enforcement and investigative efforts, allegations from around the country
can quickly produce joint enforcement efforts by multiple jurisdictions.
Individual or joint enforcement efforts of this sort will attract class actions,
although the threat of class actions exists independently as well.
The nature of the powers given regulators and especially Attorneys
General under the consumer protection laws and consumer-oriented
regulations is extremely broad and, hence, potentially destructive to
126. See Triglia, supra note 17 (“Qwest Communications reached a settlement with the
Pennsylvania Attorney General’s office after an investigation into customer complaints of
slamming and deceptive billing.”).
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carriers. Should these authorities resort to injunctive remedies, they will
have the right and power to coerce carriers to change their methods of
doing business, particularly in the areas of marketing and sales. Without
question, such remedies can be fashioned to require management’s
abdication of its discretion and acceptance of the standards and
requirements created by outside authorities. In short, carriers will lose their
rights to conduct their own businesses.
Finally, there is the threat of unfair competition claims which may be
created because of new slamming rules that rely in major part on rewarding
competitors with compensation when customers claim to have been
127
slammed. The threat is that this reward for “catching” competitors in a
regulatory error may soon awaken the predatory tendencies of the largest
carriers to bring even more monetary injuries on their smaller competitors.
The larger carriers may claim that certain pricing schemes marketed
without the fullest disclosure are unfairly competitive and subject to
injunction and forfeiture of profits.
Whether and to what extent any or all of the aforementioned
eventualities become a reality depends, to a large extent, on the legal
policies of the individual states that, according to the FCC, are now
charged with regulating the marketing and sales practices of long-distance
carriers under traditional concepts of contract and consumer protection
laws. Even more important, perhaps, is the extent to which carriers can
achieve the same or similar protections under state laws and commercial
codes as they previously enjoyed under the Filed Tariff Doctrine. An
examination of the current conditions in some states may help predict the
uncertainties that may befall carriers if this new legal environment is taken
to its logical conclusion.

A.

California

California recognizes and applies the Filed Tariff Doctrine, and
128
therefore, the constructive notice component of the doctrine which acts as
127. See 47 U.S.C. § 258(b) (1994).
Any telecommunications carrier that violates the verification procedures described
in subsection (a) and that collects charges for telephone exchange service or
telephone toll service from a subscriber shall be liable to the carrier previously
selected by the subscriber in an amount equal to all charges paid by such
subscriber after such violation, in accordance with such procedures as the [Federal
Communications] Commission may prescribe.
Id.
128. See Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000)
Not only is a carrier forbidden from charging rates other than as set out in its filed
tariff, but customers are also charged with notice of the terms and rates set out in
that filed tariff and may not bring an action against a carrier that would invalidate,

MARASHLIAN-MAC11.DOC

Number 2]

DEATH OF THE FILED TARIFF DOCTRINE

02/26/02 1:23 PM

303

a bar to many claims based on fraud, misrepresentation, and contract
129
principles. The application of the doctrine has been refined in the state by
distinguishing between activities found to be within the tariff and those
130
outside the tariff. The former type of activities or services is covered by
the Filed Tariff Doctrine; the latter is not covered. A consequence of this
approach is a narrowing of the protections of the Filed Tariff Doctrine
under California law as applied to intrastate services only. For example,
California’s Filed Tariff Doctrine gives way to the state’s Business and
131
Professions Code’s prohibition on misleading and deceptive advertising.
Such activities, if found to exist, may be enjoined under a strict liability
132
standard.
Contract law principles create the following legal environment. The
133
134
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) does not apply to services and,
hence, its constructive notice provisions are not helpful. However, the
135
California Civil Code contains a constructive notice provision. Under this
Code, if a person can be shown to have actual knowledge of circumstances
indicating a duty to inquire further into specific facts, and such inquiry is
nevertheless not made, that person may be charged with constructive notice
136
of those facts. Hence, proper notice of the need to check a carrier’s Web
sites for a recitation of all applicable terms and conditions may place the
customer in a position of being charged with constructive notice of the
alter or add to the terms of the filed tariff.
Id.
129. See Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (Cal. 1941) (“The fact that an investigation
would have revealed the falsity of the misrepresentation will not alone bar . . . recovery, and
it is well established that . . . [an individual] is not held to constructive notice of a public
record which would reveal the true facts.”) (internal citations omitted).
130. See generally Day v. AT&T Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(differentiating between the actions protected by the Filed Tariff Doctrine and the actions
the carrier would be liable for under the state’s consumer protection laws where there are
allegations of deceptive and misleading advertising with regard to phone cards).
131. See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West Supp. 2001).
132. Id. (“Any violation of the provisions of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by both that imprisonment and fine.”) (emphasis
in original).
133. See U.C.C. § 2-106 (1998).
134. See U.C.C. § 2-105 (Supp. 2001) (“Goods” means “all things (including specially
manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale . . . .”) (internal footnote omitted).
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 19 (1982) (“Every person who has actual notice of circumstances
sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of
the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such
fact.”).
136. See id.
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137

terms of which he may later claim he was unaware.
In California there are multiple problems. Whereas the Filed Tariff
138
Doctrine is an absolute and immediate defense, the California Civil Code
139
approach may result in a factual inquiry, the results of which cannot be
known except by a trial of the facts. Secondly, a court or state agency
reviewing the matter will be persuaded by the nature of the facts not fully
disclosed and the “clarity” of the disclosures made at the Web site.
Therefore, in California, even if constructive notice requirements have been
otherwise met, the Filed Tariff Doctrine will not be applied if a
misrepresentation is found to exist. At that point, the state’s Business and
Professions Code’s prohibition on misleading and deceptive advertising
would be applied.
Other expressions or iterations of the constructive notice doctrine
140
under California law include the “duty to read” and incorporation by
141
reference. Under the former, a party who signs an agreement has a duty
142
to read it and under that duty is presumed to have read it. This
presumption or duty will not attach if there is unusual or unfair language
143
involved that is not first explained. Regarding the constructive notice
doctrine, the terms and conditions of a Web-based tariff may be made
binding by reference to it in the letters of agency, if certain conditions are
met. The reference must be clear and unequivocal, it must be called to the
party’s attention so that his consent to accepting the terms by reference is
shown or can be presumed, and the terms referred to must be
understandable and readily available at the site of reference.

137. See Knox v. Modern Garage & Repair Shop, 229 P. 880 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924)
(holding that absent evidence of fraud or mistake, the party was bound by the terms of the
contract, which they should have known, even where the record indicated that the party
attempting to avoid the contract did not read it and knew nothing of the relevant provision).
138. See Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Moreover, ‘the
filed rate doctrine bars all claims – state and federal – that attempt to challenge [the terms of
a tariff] that a federal agency has reviewed and filed.’”) (internal citations omitted).
139. See previous discussion.
140. See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976) (It is a general rule
that a party is bound by contract provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the
language of a contract).
141. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (7th ed. 1999) (Incorporation by reference
means “[a] method of making a secondary document part of a primary document by
including in the primary document a statement that the secondary document should be
treated as if it were contained within the primary one.”).
142. See supra note 140.
143. See Williams v. Cal. Physicians’ Serv., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497, 508 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (“This duty to read the contract is insufficient to bind a party to unusual or unfair
language unless it is brought to the attention of the party and explained.”) (citation omitted).
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As is nearly always the case, these theories will neither produce
binding results in the face of allegations of fraud or misrepresentation, nor
apply without the need for ad hoc factual determinations.

B.

Texas

The Filed Tariff Doctrine is similarly recognized in Texas and serves
as a bar to most contractual and fraud and misrepresentation claims based
on the underlying concept of constructive notice. As with California, the
doctrine is limited in coverage and applies only to activities within the
144
scope of the tariff. This limitation in coverage leaves open the possibility
on the local, intrastate level of claims for false, misleading, or deceptive
145
acts under the state Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act.
This limitation could also lead to the raising of equitable issues and
146
defenses.
In the Texas UCC setting, a person can be shown to have knowledge
where, from all of the facts and circumstances known at the time, he has
147
reason to know of the existence of facts of which he claims ignorance. A
person has notice: (1) when he has actual knowledge; (2) he has received a
notice of it (e.g., a notice has been sent to the person’s residence or place of
business); or (3) from all the facts and circumstances known at the time, the
148
person has reason to know it exists. While this concept of constructive
notice is statutory, thereby providing the closest parallel to the Filed Tariff
Doctrine, it will still require a subjective inquiry as to the facts and
circumstances surrounding each particular customer. Accordingly, even
under the UCC, companies will remain mired in the uncertainty of their
contractual relations.
The Texas UCC also regulates contracts entered into over the
Internet, so long as one party is in Texas and the other does not have an
149
office or agent doing business in the state. This allows companies the
option to place notices and/or contractual terms (i.e., tariffs) on their Web
150
sites, which the consumers may sign with an e-signature. The benefit of
this approach, of course, is the increased viability of the constructive notice
provisions of the UCC.
144. See Kanuco Tech. Corp. v. Worldcom Network Serv., Inc., 979 S.W.2d 368, 373
(Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he doctrine ‘conclusively presumes’ that both the carrier and its
customers know the contents and effect of published tariffs.”).
145. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.12, 17.46 (Vernon 2000).
146. See id. at § 17.506 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
147. See TEX. BUS & COM. CODE § 1.201(25) (West 1994).
148. Id.
149. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1997).
150. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.110 (Vernon 1994).
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The UCC, however, will not protect companies against claims for
fraud and deceptive practices brought under the state’s Business and
Commerce Code. In addition, there are twenty-five specific acts expressly
enumerated that will be construed as false, misleading, or deceptive under
151
the Consumer Protection Act. Violations of the state’s Code and the
Consumer Protection Act can also subject the companies to injunctive
action that can place the state in a position of controlling the companies’
152
marketing and business approaches.

C.

New Jersey

In New Jersey, the Filed Tariff Doctrine protects companies in the
153
usual sense,
but does not provide absolute protection to
154
misrepresentations outside the scope of the rates charged. Moreover, like
California, companies may be subject to fraud claims seeking remedies
other than enforcement of the offered rate.
155
156
The New Jersey UCC does not apply to services. Hence, in a nonFiled Tariff Doctrine environment, companies will have to rely on
protections derived from contract law principles such as constructive
157
158
notice and incorporation by reference. These principles will apply as
they do in most other states.
Such contract law principles will not protect against claims of
misrepresentation, fraud, or material omissions under the New Jersey

151. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987).
152. Id. § 17.47.
153. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Graphnet, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 126, 132 (D. N.J. 1995)
(“[C]ustomers are charged with knowledge of the tariff rates and cannot enforce agreements
for rates other than those provided in the tariff.”).
154. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989)
The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial
practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the
knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent
that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection
with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate . . . is declared to
be an unlawful practice . . . .
Id.
155. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:2-101 (West 2001).
156. Id. See, e.g., Quality Guaranteed Roofing, Inc. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 694
A.2d 1077, 1078 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“The UCC-Sales does not, however,
apply to service contracts.”).
157. Constructive notice is “notice presumed by law to have been acquired by a person
and thus imputed to that person.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1088 (7th ed. 1999).
158. Incorporation by reference is “[a] method of making a secondary document part of a
primary document by including in the primary document a statement that the secondary
document should be treated as if it were contained within the primary one.” Id. at 770.
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159

Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Affirmative misrepresentations are subject
160
to strict liability,
except where the misrepresentation involves an
omission or failure to disclose, in which case it must be shown that the
161
company acted knowingly in making the misrepresentation. In either
case, under these principles, the companies must be careful to avoid
knowingly making misrepresentations in their marketing literature.
Finally, unique to this state is the express prohibition of “bait and
162
switch” schemes, which is also an unlawful practice under the CFA.

D.

Conclusions

Valuable practical conclusions may be derived from the current
“contracts” environment reflected in these sample states; these conclusions,
derived from our review of some state laws, may be used to guide carriers’
practices in the detariffed environment:
1. A doctrine of constructive notice exists under contract law similar
to that under the Filed Tariff Doctrine. This doctrine is not applicable,
however, without an ad hoc determination in each case with regard to its
particular surrounding circumstances. As such, companies cannot be
certain whether contractual constructive notice will be a viable protection
until after suit is brought. Conversely, the Filed Tariff Doctrine’s
constructive notice is absolute, comprehensive, and applies irrespective of
individual circumstances.
2. The contract principle of constructive notice is not applicable if
actual or constructive fraud is involved. The Filed Tariff Doctrine covers
any fraud.
3. The Filed Tariff Doctrine is a complete defense against fraud
claims based on omissions of material facts. Contract law principles
provide no such protections.
4. Under contract principles, a complainant may use a number of
theories to seek recovery, such as constructive fraud, the UCC, consumer
protection laws, and state business and professional codes that incorporate
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2001).
160. See id. at § 56:8-13 (“Any person who violates any of the provisions of the act to
which this act is a supplement shall, in addition to any other penalty provided by law, be
liable to a penalty of no more than $7,500 for the first offense and not more than $15,000 for
the second and each subsequent offense.”); Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350
(N.J. 1997).
161. See Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d at 350.
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:8-2.2 (West 1989) (“The advertisement of merchandise as
part of a plan or scheme not to sell the item or service so advertised or not to sell the same at
the advertised price is an unlawful practice and a violation of the act to which this act is a
supplement.”).
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the concept of unfair competition—meaning that a competitor, as well as a
customer, could sue. Such theories have no viability under the Filed Tariff
Doctrine.
5. Without the Filed Tariff Doctrine, post-sale disclosures offer no
protection. Moreover, while post-sale disclosures may reduce damage
claims, they do not immunize the companies against class actions or
Attorney General actions seeking injunctive relief against pre-sale
marketing materials and representations.
6. Under the UCC, a course of dealings between a seller and buyer
can result in the buyer being bound by new terms and conditions
unilaterally imposed by the seller. Any defense to recovery of charges
grounded in the assertion that no consideration existed to bind the buyer to
the new terms or rates would be overcome if it could be shown that the
buyer had a continuous course of dealings with the seller after terms and
prices were changed and the buyer had not objected to those changes.
Under such principles, the right to unilaterally change rates could be
defended, but the success in doing so is problematic compared to coverage
by the Filed Tariff Doctrine.
First, under the Filed Tariff Doctrine, unilateral changes never require
consideration or any continued course of dealings after changes have been
made. Even under the UCC principle cited above, unless there is a
sufficient period of time that elapses to establish a “course of dealing,” no
customer is bound by a unilateral change in terms or price. Second, under
the UCC, ad hoc factual determinations would be required as to each
customer. Third, there is no set time frame for the continued dealings to
rise to the level of “course of dealings” that serves to defend against attack
by the customer. Fourth, no course of dealings could arise if the customer
claims fraud.
Most importantly, analysis of this UCC principle on “course of
dealings” points to perhaps one of the most serious deficiencies in a world
without the Filed Tariff Doctrine: the inability to unilaterally raise rates. At
a very minimum, it would make effecting such changes extremely difficult
and costly, and certitude that the changes could be defended as legal and
proper would never be achieved, or achieved only after an indefinite period
of time.
7. Under contract law protection, certain types of marketing could
easily be cited as “bait and switch” tactics under consumer fraud laws. One
remedy available to Attorneys General would be particularly draconian—
namely, the ability to enjoin the marketing of products marketed without
full disclosure of the relevant factors, with the Attorneys General defining
the meaning of “full disclosure.”
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What these conclusions and inevitable uncertainties confirm is that
the FCC did not consider the effect its proclamation about the Filed Tariff
Doctrine would have on carriers. The FCC also did not consider the
resulting ripple effect. That is, the increased exposure to carriers will
undoubtedly increase their costs that, in turn, will have a detrimental effect
on the ultimate consumer. All of this bolsters the conclusion that the FCC’s
actions were irresponsible and in defiance of its statutory obligation to
balance competing interests.

V. IMMEDIATE STATE REACTION TO FEDERAL DETARIFFING
163

Shortly after the FCC’s Detariffing Order became effective, longdistance carriers began feeling its effects through the actions of several
states. From the initiation of a class action lawsuit in California, to the
delivery of letters from the Attorneys General and/or Consumer Protection
Agencies announcing the respective state’s interpretation of the federal
detariffing mandate, the swift reactions to the federal detariffing mandate
confirm the fears expressed throughout this Article. This Section describes
and discusses some of these reactions and serves as an example of what
long-distance carriers can expect in the future as a result of federal
detariffing.

A.

California

California residents wasted little time before attacking long-distance
giant, AT&T. On July 31, 2001, the date the FCC’s detariffing mandate
164
a non-profit membership
became effective, Consumer Action,
organization committed to consumer education and advocacy, and an
individual representative plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against AT&T
in the Alameda Superior Court in Oakland, California, alleging violations
165
of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act and the Unfair Business
166
The suit assailed AT&T’s use of mailings to bind
Practices Act.
customers to terms and conditions of service—the most common method
167
chosen by carriers as a substitute for filed tariffs.

163. See Common Carrier Bureau Extends Transition Period for Detariffing Consumer
Long Distance Services, Public Notice, 16 F.C.C.R. 3747 (2000).
164. See http://www.consumer-action.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
165. See CAL. CODE §§ 1750-1756 (West 2001).
166. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17000 (West 2001).
167. See Complaint, Ting-Consumer Action v. AT&T, at http://www.consumeraction.org/Library/English/Alert/AT-I-10_EN/AT-I-10_EN.html
(July
30,
2001)
[hereinafter Ting Complaint].
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The Complaint focused on the Consumer Services Agreement
(“CSA”) notice sent by AT&T to its customers which, among other things,
imposed binding arbitration on customers, allowed AT&T to change terms
and conditions unilaterally through mailings and Web postings, and
168
significantly limited the carrier’s liability. Most importantly, the CSA
bound customers to the terms and conditions through continued use of
AT&T services, specifically stating that:
BY ENROLLING IN, USING, OR PAYING FOR THE SERVICES,
YOU AGREE TO THE PRICES, CHARGES, TERMS AND
CONDITIONS IN THIS AGREEMENT. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE
TO THE PRICES, CHARGES, TERMS AND CONDITIONS, DO
NOT USE THE SERVICES, AND CANCEL THE SERVICES
169
IMMEDIATELY . . . .

The class action suit alleged that the provisions of the CSA and the
method of presentment to AT&T’s customers were “unlawful, unfair,
170
fraudulent and unconscionable.” The plaintiffs argued that by sending the
CSA in a monthly statement along with numerous other documents, AT&T
deliberately camouflaged the arbitration provision in a way that assured
that few customers would voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently consent
171
to it. The allegation was that, under general contract law principles, the
waiver of constitutional rights (such as the rights to due process or a jury
172
trial) must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
The
plaintiffs’ argument was that if the customer does not actually read and
fully comprehend the document purporting to waive her constitutional
right, she cannot have voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently consented
173
to the waiver.
Another key point of attack for the plaintiffs was a series of
provisions within the CSA that were designed to limit the rights and
remedies of AT&T’s customers in the event of a dispute. The controversial
provisions included binding arbitration, elimination of class actions, and
limitations on damages (collectively, the “Legal Remedies Provisions”).
174
The court initially denied the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, but set
175
the matter for trial to address the consumer protection law charges.

168. See id. paras. 2-3.
169. Id. para. 22 (emphasis in original).
170. Id. para. 2.
171. See id. paras. 60-71.
172. See id. paras. 69-70.
173. See Ting Complaint, supra note 167, paras. 69-70.
174. State Activities, Fed. Magistrate in San Francisco Rejected Plea, COMM. DAILY,
Aug. 29, 2001, at 6.
175. See id.
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During the trial, the court focused its attention on the Legal Remedies
Provisions. The plaintiffs argued that AT&T’s arbitration provision
stripped consumers of their substantive rights under the law because: (1) it
imposed a two-year statute of limitations, which is shorter than all
176
otherwise applicable statutes of limitations under California law, and (2)
it prohibited punitive damages claims in contravention of the California
177
Civil Code. The plaintiffs also argued that the arbitration provision
sought to shelter AT&T from liability by preventing customers from
initiating class action lawsuits, all the while knowing that class actions are
the only effective means of recovery for consumers who typically have
small claims and cannot otherwise afford to pursue individual recourse
178
against large telecommunications carriers. Plaintiffs argued that this was
particularly unconscionable in light of the high fees associated with
arbitration and the fact that the American Arbitration Association was not a
neutral arbitrator because it was biased in favor of corporate defendants
179
such as AT&T.
On January 15, 2002, in a sweeping, seventy-five page decision,
District Judge Bernard Zimmerman issued his Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and ordered that a permanent injunction be issued
preventing AT&T from enforcing the Legal Remedies Provisions of its
180
CSA against California residents. The judge held that AT&T’s “ban on
181
and declared illegal AT&T’s
class actions [was] unconscionable”
provision seeking to impose a two-year limitations period for customers to
file any claim in arbitration, even though nearly all California consumer
protection laws allow consumers to file claims for at least three or four
182
years from the time of injury.
Consumer Action’s press release on the subject notes that although
Judge Zimmerman’s decision did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs’
basic formation of contract issues, he did comment on them indirectly by
noting:
[T]he terms and conditions of [AT&T’s contract] were imposed on
class members without an opportunity for negotiation, modification or
176. See Ting Complaint, supra note 167, para. 35.
177. See id. para. 36.
178. See id. paras. 38-39.
179. See id. para. 49.
180. See Ting v. AT&T, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, No. C 01-02969 BZ,
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2002), available at http://www.consumer-action.org/Library/English/
Press_Release/PR-I-60_EN.pdf.
181. See Press Release, Consumer Action, Consumer Action Wins Landmark Ruling
Against AT&T Over Binding Arbitration Clause (Jan. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.consumer-action.org/Library/English/Press_Release/PR-I-60_EN.html.
182. See id.
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waiver. . . . [C]ustomers did not have any meaningful choice with
respect to the Legal Remedies Provisions because the carriers who
service two-thirds of the California market all include substantially
183
similar dispute resolution provisions in their contracts.

Standing alone, the court’s resolution of the issues surrounding the
Legal Remedies Provisions will have far-reaching effects on the industry.
Among those who will feel the impact most are the long-distance carriers
conducting business in California that followed AT&T, the industry
184
leader’s approach to detariffing compliance.
Questions remain about the use of mail inserts, such as AT&T’s CSA,
to establish a carrier’s right to act in its discretion to control the pricing and
services it offers without having to re-execute in some formal manner
individual contracts with its customers. Answers will, in turn, directly
affect the all-important right of a carrier to market and bind consumers
quickly, uniformly, and cost-effectively. This right clearly existed under
the former tariffing regime and the resultant Filed Tariff Doctrine. And,
although AT&T employed a Filed Tariff Doctrine defense, the judge
185
dismissed it as it pertained to the Legal Remedies Provisions.
The court did not, however, address the bigger question as to whether
the right of carriers to bind consumers quickly, uniformly, and costeffectively to their rates, terms, and conditions, and changes thereto,
continues to exist irrespective of detariffing under the same concept of
presumed, or constructive, knowledge effected by Web posting or some
other method. Even though the judge avoided directly confronting the
question, the tone of the decision alone will have widespread ramifications
on the long-distance industry and the methods carriers use to pursue
contractual relationships with customers on a going-forward basis.

B.

Wisconsin

Wisconsin, like California, also reacted to federal detariffing swiftly
when, on August 10, 2001, William Oemichen, Administrator of the State’s
183. See id.
184. See Ting v. AT&T, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, No. C 01-02969 BZ,
para. 38 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2002), available at http://www.consumer-action.org/Library/
English/Press_Release/PR-I-60_EN.pdf. (“The long distance providers who have imposed
substantially similar legal remedies provisions have a combined market share of well over
65% of all California long distance customers.”).
185. See id. para. 119. The judge states: “In light of the clear purpose of the filed rate
doctrine, AT&T’s reliance on the filed rate doctrine is misplaced.” Id. By “purpose” is
meant a concern for the potential for carriers to charge discriminatory rates to, or to impose
discriminatory terms on, their customers, and not for whether their customers were able to
resolve disputes before a court or an arbitrator, or whether their customers were able to file a
class action.
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Division of Trade and Consumer Protection, an office within the
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, mailed a letter
186
to all long-distance carriers operating in the state. The letter informs
carriers operating in Wisconsin that, “. . . as of August 1, 2001, domestic
long-distance communication providers no longer file rates with the
187
FCC.” The letter warns that “[w]e have reviewed several consumer
services agreements being sent by telecommunications service providers to
Wisconsin consumers, and notice a number of potential violations of
188
Wisconsin telecommunications law.” The letter goes on to review several
violations of Wisconsin law that the Department had been made aware of
189
in the few days following detariffing. As evidenced by its letter,
Wisconsin wasted no time in implementing procedures designed to protect
the newfound rights of its consumers.
Of greater concern to carriers, Mr. Oemichen asked Wisconsin’s
Justice Department to file a lawsuit against AT&T and WorldCom for noncompliance with the new detariffing requirements and apparent conflicts
190
with state law. Oemichen claimed that the post-detariffing pricing
191
disclosure policies of the carriers were in violation of state law. The
carriers were using consumer service agreements to notify customers of
192
their prices. Mr. Oemichen stated that such agreements are insufficient
because they do not provide adequate customer notification of rate
193
In order for customer notification to be satisfactory in
changes.
Wisconsin, the service provider must give customers twenty-five to ninety
days notice prior to any rate changes, provide customers adequate avenues
by which to complain, and may not post the rate changes on their corporate
194
Web sites. Oemichen pointed out that not every Wisconsin citizen has
195
Internet access.
The Wisconsin action provides a clear example of the real and
potential conflicts between state law and regulations and FCC expectations

186. See Letter from William L. Oemichen, Administrator, Division of Trade and
Consumer Protection for the State of Wisconsin, to New Century Telecom, Inc. (Aug. 10,
2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from William L. Oemichen].
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. State Activities, Wis. Dept. of Agriculture, Trade & Consumer Protection, COMM.
DAILY, Sept. 4, 2001, at 6.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Letter from William L. Oemichen, supra note 186.
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196

pertaining to detariffing. One of the immediate dichotomies revealed by
Wisconsin consumer protection law against Web posting is that it is in
direct conflict with the FCC’s requirement that carriers must post their
tariffs (rates, terms, and conditions of service) on their corporate Web sites
197
as opposed to filing those paper tariffs with the Commission. In
compliance with FCC mandates, AT&T has posted its tariffs on its Web
198
site. As predicted in this Article, however, AT&T and others in the future
will now be subjected to actions brought by state governments such as
Wisconsin, despite compliance with federal requirements.

C.

Conclusion

Long-distance service providers such as AT&T and WorldCom have
199
asserted that state laws cannot govern interstate services. State officials
tasked with protecting consumer interests argue, however, that through
detariffing, the FCC has relieved itself of its regulatory responsibility and
200
deferred to state laws. This argument is consistent with previous court
196. See State Activities, Wis. Dept. of Agriculture, Trade & Consumer Protection,
COMM. DAILY, Sept. 4, 2001, at 6.
Both carriers [AT&T and Worldcom] have contended that FCC detariffing order
superseded state laws so Wis. statutes couldn’t govern interstate services. But
consumer protection officials said FCC had removed itself from regulatory picture
and so had deferred to Wis. law, which barred sellers from proposing service
agreements that waived customer rights as condition of service.
Id.
197. Domestic, Interexchange Carrier Detariffing Order Takes Effect, Public Notice, 16
F.C.C.R. 3688 (2000).
Section 42.10 (a) of the Commission’s rules requires that: “[a] nondominant
interexchange carrier shall make available to any member of the public, in a [sic]
least one location, during regular business hours, information concerning its
current rates, terms and condition for all of its detariffed interstate, domestic,
interexchange services. Such information shall be make available in an easy to
understand format and in a timely manner . . . . Section 42.10 (b) of the
Commission’s rules states that: “a nondominant IXC that maintains an Internet
website shall make such rate and service information specified in paragraph (a) of
this section available on-line at its Internet website in a timely and easily
accessible manner, and shall update this information regularly.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
198. See http://www.attbroadband.com/tariffs/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2001).
199. See Order on Reconsideration, supra note 55. In its comments, AT&T contends
that parties may interpret the statement in the Second Report and Order that, with complete
detariffing, “consumers will also be able to pursue remedies under state consumer protection
and contract laws” as allowing challenges under state law to the lawfulness of rates, terms,
and conditions for these interstate services. AT&T argued that any interpretation that
authorizes such challenges under state law is foreclosed by numerous judicial decisions
recognizing that Sections 201 and 202 of the Communications Act preempt state law with
respect to the reasonableness of rates, terms, and conditions for interstate
telecommunications services.
200. See id.
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rulings that states may regulate in areas involving interstate/intrastate
telecommunications if the FCC abandons the field. However, as the
Authors have argued throughout this Article, regardless of whether or not
the FCC has in fact abandoned the field, stare decisis dictates that state
courts cannot abandon the filed tariff doctrine.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Commission’s detariffing actions are difficult to square with
several fundamental precepts about regulation by a titular independent
agency. By definition, the FCC is to act, make rules, and decide issues
without undue influence from the sitting presidential administration. Under
the 1934 Communications Act, as amended, the FCC is to regulate in the
public interest and with regard to common carriers and their customers; the
FCC has been charged to balance the interests of both carrier and customer.
By law, the FCC cannot act inconsistently with its enabling statute,
disregard the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, or waive or
ignore statutory provisions. Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, before
the Commission issues regulations it must consider the impact of those
regulations on small businesses. As this Article demonstrates, the FCC has
done none of these things effectively and, in some cases, has acted contrary
to these precepts.
While perhaps coincidental, the timing of the FCC’s initial
Detariffing Order was only a few days before the 1996 presidential
election. The fact that the FCC has consistently promoted detariffing as an
important consumer issue, and given the Clinton administration’s adoption
of the cloak of champion of communications at that time, created the
appearance that detariffing found justification in its potential populous
political capital rather than in the policy’s inherent merits. Unfortunately,
in the five years since the initial adoption of the policy, the FCC has done
nothing to dispel this appearance. Indeed it has, if anything, enhanced it.
The Commission’s approach to detariffing is clearly centered on its
views of consumer protection. There is no debate that the Commission was
created to protect consumers whose bargaining leverage with common
carriers was nonexistent. Title II of the Communications Act is designed to
eliminate unreasonable practices and undue discrimination and to provide
everyone affected by the rates, terms, and conditions by which services are
offered and rendered the same detailed notice of their existence and to
thereby bind all users of those services by those rates, terms, and conditions
without exception. At the same time, however, the Commission was not to
favor one constituency over the other. While the Commission was to
provide a balance for the lack of consumer bargaining power with carriers,
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it was not authorized, nor could it have constitutionally been authorized, to
overrun and ignore the rights of carriers.
Yet, a case has been made that by mandating detariffing, the FCC has
tipped the balance of rights it is charged to maintain. The Commission has
moved over totally to the consumer camp, taking up their cause and
empowering them with the rights to sick the dogs of a thousand
disgruntlements on carriers. In doing so, the FCC has ignored not only
Congress’s directives that the rights of both parties are to be balanced, but
also the Supreme Court’s establishment of this same legal principle.
The Filed Tariff Doctrine’s core justification resides not just in its
major underpinning—anti-discrimination—nor in the means by which this
goal is achieved: constructive notice and the force of law that tariffs have.
The core justification rests in the balancing of individual rights against
broader public interest rights. By promoting consumerism above all aspects
of detariffing, the FCC has opted to favor the individual’s right not to be
misled or cheated. This is a noble end in theory, but what about it in the
context in which the balance that is to be maintained between the rights of
consumers and carriers is designed to protect the largest number of
consumers? In the Commission’s rush to add to its other consumer boons,
such as the Gore-tax or e-rate charges, it failed to examine, much less
consider, this concern for all consumers versus some consumers and the
true costs of such a policy shift after a near century of existence has been
ignored.
Why? Because the Filed Tariff Doctrine is based on the fundamental
principal that if a carrier were subjected to thousands of disagreements with
its customers, most involving small sums, the carriers’ cost of operations
would increase and those increased costs would be passed on to other
consumers of the carriers’ services through higher rates. To protect the
broader public interests, the Filed Tariff Doctrine balances the rights of the
parties involved. It required both parties to live by the terms of the tariffs
that governed the services being provided. It delegated to consumers some
duty of care, and some responsibility for their actions. It also required the
carrier to be certain that the terms it adopted were those it could succeed
with, because the carrier must, without deviation from the published terms,
adhere to those rates.
By detariffing for the purpose of declaring that the Filed Tariff
Doctrine no longer has application, the FCC has shown that it has lost the
thread of proper regulation of carrier-customer relationships. It has
abandoned its duty to preserve the balance of these respective rights that
must be preserved by both congressional and Supreme Court directives.
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The Commission attempts to counter such arguments by stating that it
has only subjected telecommunications carriers to the same business
methods used by other industries, that is, private contractual dealings. But
this is simply not so, and is irrelevant in any event. While there are
industries that deal with tens of thousands of customers, these industries
have never operated in a regulatory environment in which all of their terms
of service must be publicly filed and subjected to challenge before a federal
agency. More importantly, no other industry is required to post its rates,
terms, and conditions in detail on the World Wide Web as do
telecommunications common carriers. The Filed Tariff Doctrine provided
the quid pro quo for the duty to publish these terms. Each consumer has
access to the same information, and in return, is bound by that information
whether he knows of or understands it.
The consumer’s protection is to ask before purchasing. Alternatively,
if a consumer believes that a rate or term is unreasonable or discriminatory,
he may complain after purchase. But if the consumer’s complaint must
show more than that the rate or term has been contained in the tariff, or that
he claims he was told that another rate or term was available and, without
checking the tariff or asking that the tariff be provided, he accepts the offer
as presented, finding out later that the tariff did not provide for such a rate
or term is not a basis to avoid the application of that rate or term. The fact
that the system can lead—and has led—to some individual hardships is of
no consequence, not because the law is unfair, but because the law balances
the relative rights of the individual and the public at large and, in this
instance, makes the necessary judgment that the public’s rights must
prevail. American jurisprudence is replete with such balancing of rights.
The Commission not only has overlooked these principles, but also has
simply ignored the lawful limitations on its authority. It knows that it
cannot overturn a Supreme Court doctrine or ignore a congressional statute.
But it attempts to sidestep these problems by emphasizing form over
substance. It is one thing for a federal agency to get the law wrong; it
seems quite another when the agency knows it has the law wrong, yet
dodges the consequences with shallow reasoning and/or a refusal to address
the issues, and actually promotes aggressive application of its erroneous
policy. But this is what the FCC has done and continues to do. It has
encouraged the states to assert state laws over interstate communications,
and without any notice or public comment, has sought to empower state
bodies to advance private consumer rights.
As is typical for a bureaucracy, the Commission has dismissed,
without discussion or consideration of the evidence, the economic impact
its policies will have on the industry in general, the public, and small
businesses. It also appears to have ignored the fact that a statute requires it
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to address these issues.
The Commission’s detariffing actions and subsequent promotions
may constitute one of the more severe examples of bad government
regulation, or in this case, bad “deregulation.” Whether it will have similar
adverse effects, as in the “deregulation” of power in California, remains to
be seen. But the disregard for proper adherence to legal precedents,
statutory directives, and sound administrative procedure should be
disturbing to the industry, Congress, and those who are more enlightened
within the Commission itself.

